Notes on “information security” and international arrangements
In the following paragraphs I want to examine the issues with regulating cyberspace in cooperation with Russia, showing that agreements on Moscow’s terms could legitimize authoritarian control over information and bind others without truly constraining Russia.
I’ll explore how autocratic regimes have used disarmament talks for self-interest in the past (and yes, there will be the mandatory reference to Nazi Germany and the period of Appeasement), how Russia’s cyber treaty proposals since the 1990s harbor hidden obstacles, why Russia’s definition of “information security” is incompatible with the West’s concept of cybersecurity, and how accepting Russia’s framing could undermine free speech and empower hypocrisy.
I will also touch on the long-running debate over applying existing international law to cyberspace versus creating new rules – and how Russia exploits that ambiguity (or at least tries to use the threat of a “Wild West in cyberspace” to coerce others) – as well as the U.S. preference for flexible norms instead of binding treaties.
BytFinally, I will talk about Russia’s success in partnering with China on information security, and why they were able to come to agreements when “the West” was unable to (in short it’s because of the true intent behind these initiatives, controlling online discourse and quashing dissent).
